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Important Nepal Article: “Revolution and Compromise”

Posted by Mike E on June 24, 2008

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7 Responses to “Important Nepal Article: “Revolution and Compromise””

  1. NSPF said

    June 26, 2008 at 8:42 pm

    Comrade Biplap says “there is an incessant and fierce struggle between two different world outlooks” in Nepal on the question of compromise: a Marxist outlook and an opportunist and reformist one.
    He characterises the non-Marxist one as negotiationism. He says from a CLASS POINT OF VIEW the opportunist and reformist outlook belongs to and serves the interests of the Nepali Congress and not the Maoist Party.

    After mentioning some stark differences of the two outlooks he states unequivocally that “due to the impact of class struggle …. the tendency of ‘negotiationism’ is spreading like a viral disease within our party.” And he goes on to warn that “this type of tendency developing within the party is hundred times more dangerous than the ‘negotiationism’ of the NC.”

    He, furthermore, charges this tendency WITHIN THE MAOIST PARTY with seeking “to end the political revolution” “through the so called economic ‘revolution’ and power sharing.”

    In opposition to this outlook, he condemns the steady weakening and/or dissolution of the major instruments of revolutionary power. He goes on to say in effect, that the reactionaries, having been emboldened by all of these are now seeking to scalp the revolution by their seven point demand. He warns that to accept these latest demands would be as bad as declaring the end of revolution.
    Instead, comrade Biplap argues for a reversal of course and a return to the fundamental principles of marxism as opposed to negotiationism.

    Assuming this is a correct understanding of what c. Biplap is saying, the question to explore is wheather he is right or not.

  2. Nando said

    June 27, 2008 at 8:10 am

    i think that he is saying that there are times with necessary compromise, but that there are lines that appear beyond which the compromise becomes capitulation (abandonment of what the fight is for).

    There is a wavelike motion to political processes (all processes really) — advance and consolidation, and new advance. And at each stage there is a struggle over what changes are necessary, and what changes represent a revision of necessary goals and methods.

    This party entered into negotiations but it did not abandon its army or its militant youth wing. It offered to abide by elections, but it did not abandon the rev goals that it represented since its beginning.

    I believe he is saying that there is a turning point here, where the issues is whether to advance (toward actual revolution ,seizure of power, pressing for the needed social transformation) or whether the struggle so far is reduced (objectively) to a fight to “get in” at the top tier of politics of the system.

    I think the question of political and economic revolution is an important one. Often, recently, some within their party have implied that the goal is simply economic improvement… the antifeudal character of the revolution in Nepal was sometimes portrayed as a revolution for a capitalist society. But in fact, the question of roads presents itself. What kind of economy? What kind of society to replace the feudal one?

    That is why the renewed discussions of rural communes (and their continued existence as models in some areas) is very important — because for the poor farmers of nepal, the socialist road (cooperatives to communes) has hope for change (both social and the economic climb from utter poverty).

  3. NSPF said

    June 27, 2008 at 9:49 pm

    “I believe he is saying that there is a turning point here, where the issues is whether to advance (toward actual revolution ,seizure of power, pressing for the needed social transformation) or whether the struggle so far is reduced (objectively) to a fight to “get in” at the top tier of politics of the system.”

    But turning points, which mark the start of a change of direction, do not occure for no reason at all. Something or some process gives rise to this change of direction.

    If everything the party was doing and saying during the protracted process of negotiations from 2005, correspond to the maxim of strategic firmness and tactical flexibility, then how is it possible to explain c. Biplap’s statement that “a tendency considers that it will make no difference if we accept the seven-point demand of the NC”?

    Biplaps explanation seems to be that “this conflict, indeed, is related to the series of compromises we have made.”

  4. Mike E said

    June 28, 2008 at 8:13 am

    NSPF writes: “But turning points, which mark the start of a change of direction, do not occure for no reason at all. Something or some process gives rise to this change of direction.”

    well, this does not seem to be a huge mystery: there was a profound and growing antimonarchy movement — starting in 1990 and taking a huge leap after the Palace massacre and the coup by Gyenendra. the Maoists (as the most consistent opponents of monarchy, and the most uncompromising spearhead for a federal republic) gained great support and came to lead the effort (in alliance with other more vacillating forces).

    with the leaving of the monarchy, the question came squarely to the fore: “what kind of republic? what kind of society after the overthrow of the king? what kind of system if the feudal forces are beaten back?”

    And in that moment new contradictions (and new antagonisms) come to the fore — especially because the struggle for new democracy is not simply a struggle against feudalism, but also against those in society serving imperialism (the comprador bourgeoisie) in various ways. Historically, (to put it simply) the monarchy was allied to feudal forces who wanted to maintain independence of Nepal from India. And the Congress party was a representative of forces linked to India (which has dominated Nepal for a long time).

    This is part of understanding particularity and the stages within things. Mao said the road is tortuous and the future is bright. The first part means “twists and turns.” He is saying that the advance toward a rev goal requires complex switches, maneuvers, setbacks, compromises and then (through that process) new advance.

    NSPF writes:

    “If everything the party was doing and saying during the protracted process of negotiations from 2005, correspond to the maxim of strategic firmness and tactical flexibility, then how is it possible to explain c. Biplap’s statement that “a tendency considers that it will make no difference if we accept the seven-point demand of the NC”?”

    I think this is a great question to discuss.

    First, we need dialectics — no one argues that “everything the party was doing or saying” corresponds to….

    In fact this party is a complex movement itself — with distinct wings that have (at all points) been saying and doing ) somewhat different things. The question is not whether “everything the party was doing and saying” was correct (since it is often hard to sum up in the process precisely what is “firm and flexible” — it is a relative matter). The question is whether OVERALL the approach of the Maoists (to use a period of negotiation to isolate their enemies, neutralize foreign threats, and win broader support) built towards the revolution — without generating “necessities” (expectations, current, compromises) that are both negative and avoidable.

    Now to the second part… how is it possible to explain that there might be “a tendency” that considers accepting the seven point demand?

    The answer is that forces arise in revolutionary movements pursuing different lines. this is inevitable, it has been called a “law” of politics. It was certainly true in both Lenin’s and Mao’s movements. In periods of compromise, alliance and joint work, there were powerful currents (in the ranks and in the top leadership) who saw such alliances as permanent, and were willing to sacrifice key goals of the revolution to maintain them. Mao called it “everything through the United Front” — and it was a powerful current (that didn’t dissolve after the revolution but continued all the way through the socialist process — as “bourgeois democrats” became “capitalist-roaders” in the leadership of the CCP.)

    when Lenin arrived at the Finland Station (in April 1917), his in-country leadership (and the editorial board of Pravda) were in a mode of “critical support” for the bourgeois government, and many thought that Lenin’s call for a second revolution was literally nuts. As the October Revolutoin approached, some of those leaders (including his close aide Zinoviev) took to the streets to oppose the plans for insurrection — calling for a joint government betweeen the Bolsheviks and various pro-capitalist parties.

    Speaking for myself, I am not eager to simply announce or endorse any particular policy of the revolution in Nepal. I don’t think we have to have a verdict on the negotiations, or on the decision to make the anti-monarchy struggle a substage, or the decision to accept the comprimise of cantonment for the peoples army, or the decision to dissolve the peoples courts as part of the agreement…..

    But it is quite possible for a party to be overall correct in its tactics and strategy, and also develop powerful currents that want to make their peace with powerful non-revolutionary political forces in society. In fact, in any real struggle, in anyc movement where the revolutionaries are actually leading millions and dealing with with the tough choices of moving forward (with severe consequences WHICHEVER way they go)…. not only is it possible, but such intense two-line struggle is inevitable.

    And it is quite true that the compromises and alliances PREVIOUSLY made encourage rightist tendencies among the people, and strenghten rightist forces within the party’s leadership. that too is an objective process. (SImilarly the decades of relative isolation among revolutionaries in the U.S. have, unfortunately, strengthened a tendency to dismiss the importance of actually ORGANIZING the people for revolution, and to some degree ACCEPT and even HONOR such isolation as proof of revolutionary clarity.) The conditions that the revolution advances through helps frame the internal relations within the party, and influences the relative strength and aggressivness of different currents.

    Such struggles over road have ALWAYS been particularly intense within revolutionary parties on the eve of the seizure of power. The existing fissures and lines within a party are stressed when key, historic decisions need to be made, and major risks need to be evaluated.

    there is a famous stanza in Dylan’s song “the day the ship comes in” — where the captain driven back by a mutiny stands at the bow and yells to the mutineers “We will meet all your demands.” And the rebels yell back “your days are numbered.”

    At a certain point in revolution, those in power offer to “meet all your demands” as long as THEY keep power (and therefore can regroup to unleash the counterrevolution and crush the revs at some future point). and at that point, when the oppressors offer the sun and the moon, and only demand (in return) that the rebels back away from actually seizing power — there is (historically and perhaps inevitably) a sharp question among the people and among the revolutionaries over whether to accept that.

    the struggle is real, and it is a life and death struggle. And it is an example of where the leading revolutionary party itself (and its top leadership) emerges as a key arena of the class struggle — a major place where different visions of society are being fought out.

  5. NSPF said

    June 28, 2008 at 10:46 pm

    Mike identifies the turning point “with the leaving of the monarchy” and the question of alternatives to replace it. He says “in that moment new contradictions (and new antagonisms) came to the fore.”

    The emergence/existence of different lines and tendencies is, as Mike says, inevitable.
    An important point, howevere, is to ascertain at any given situation in a revolution, what policies will strengthen or weaken those tendencies; there is a view which cannot be dismissed lightly, that the package of policies that gave rise to the comprehensive peace accord, brought the revolutionary process to a turning point.

    Maoists have another maxim that is very important in this regard to ponder on and that is “you fight your way and I fight mine.” It is extremly important to bear this in mind when we enter into negotiation with the enemy; for an important part of their agenda, when they enter into negotiation with revolutionaries, is to get them, by hook or crook, to enter into THEIR ground and play it by THEIR rules.

    Experience has shown that they are experts at incrementally, and in a protracted process, trying to leure revolutionaries where THEY want to engage them. If that happens then we have lost the innitiative and momentum and they can grind us down, split us and eat us piece by piece through co-optation or downright crushing. The other side has its think tanks and crisis groups for a reason; and even in a “remote” place such as Nepal, the reactionaries have at their disposal huge resouses and the experience of THEIR international. I will not go into the details of these, for I’m sure everyone here is aware of them; but as an example, would point at the game they played at the expence of the Palestinians since the Madrid peace conference.
    At any rate, the other side also has a target and a goal when they enter into negotiation with revolutionaries: their target is to weaken, split, and eventually destroy the revolutionary force as a revolutionary force, and their goal is to teach the people of that country and the world the lesson that you will never succeed through revolt.and those who led you are now either with us, defanged or destroyed.

    So, a protracted process of negotiation and peace accord has to be evaluated against this background:

    Does it give the initiative to the other side?

    Would it leur the revolutionaries to their enemy’s ground where they can create negative necessities in the course of revolution and hence embolden and strengthen the hand of the rightist tendency in the party?

    Would it further arm, subjectively and objectively, the social base of revolution with the necessity of all the way revolution or would it create illusion and confusion as to the possibility of reforming the system?

  6. hannah m said

    August 20, 2008 at 2:05 am

    helloooo can any body give me an article!!!

  7. Mike E said

    August 20, 2008 at 6:59 am

    the article is linked to: click on the image showing the article revolution and compromise.

    or use this link:

    http://southasiarev.wordpress.com/2008/06/24/red-star-10-revolution-and-compromise/

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